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ABSTRACT

This article uses Heidegger’s critique of the aesthetic tradition to reconsider the limits and potential of aesthetic rhetoric. Contextualizing rhetoric’s so-called aesthetic turn within the German aesthetic tradition, we argue that aesthetic rhetoric remains constrained by aesthetics’ traditional opposition to the rational and the true. This theoretical heritage has often prevented contemporary aesthetic rhetorical theory from considering the value of art beyond sense experience and ritualized cultural reproduction. We claim, however, that rhetoric can be artistic and at the same time project a community’s evolving sense of political and social truth. Through an analysis of Simón Bolívar’s Angostura Address, which in 1819 inaugurated a political rebirth of the Venezuelan republic, we demonstrate how the art of rhetoric can exhibit Heidegger’s three senses of “aletheiaic” truth: the bestowing, grounding, and beginning of a political community.

KEYWORDS: Heidegger; rhetoric; aesthetics; aletheia; Simón Bolívar; art

But that which remains the poets have founded.
J. C. F Hölderlin, “Andenken”

In contemporary rhetorical theory, the relationship between rhetoric and art tends to be articulated in terms of aesthetics. This increasingly popular discourse on “aesthetic rhetoric,” however, is characterized by a remarkable diversity. The rhetoric of fiction, poetry, and other literary genres, for example, has been explored in these terms (e.g., Booth 1983), as has the rhetoric of film (Haskins 2003), photography (Hariman and Lucaites 2007), and even natural landscapes (Clark 2004). From a different perspective, aesthetics

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has been distilled to a range of “features” or “elements” that a given text is said to possess. Nathan Crick and Jeremy Engels, for example, have described rhetoric as aesthetic “insofar as it employ[s] the conventions of narrative, imagery, and characterization” (2012, 287); similarly, Brian Ott and Diane Keeling’s recent essay on Lost in Translation provides a skillful reading of that film’s aesthetic rhetoric, which they define as its nonsymbolic and material “dimensions” (2011).

This diversity—which finds aesthetics representing the rhetoric of literary genres, the visual arts, landscapes, imagery, tropes, and so on—is perhaps best summed up by Ott and Keeling’s identification of the aesthetic with the nonsymbolic, the material, the sensual, and the affective. That is, what unifies these scholars’ conception of “aesthetic rhetoric” is less a commitment to a set of methodological concerns or an intellectual tradition than an interest in exploring rhetoric beyond the rational and the true. As with Ott and Keeling, this concern often surfaces as a division of rhetoric into two distinct elements, one of which is rational and psychocentric, the other of which is sensuous, creative, and artistic. John Poulakos presents this tension, for example, when he reminds us that rhetoric has been celebrated “not only for its communicability vis-à-vis the things it names, the arguments it advances or the things it calls into existence, but also for the figural and tropical features that render rhetorical discourse attractive and compelling, in a word, eloquent; and the audience had been understood not only as capable of communal judgment based on subjective perception and personal belief but also as subject to a wide array of feelings ranging from delight and pleasure to fear and terror, to joy and ecstasy” (2007, 336).

This dissociative tendency to divide rhetoric into two elements—and then to privilege rhetoric’s aesthetic “features” above its rational, utilitarian ones—bears obvious traces of what Hayden White calls “the ideology of aestheticism” (2010). According to White, early theorists of aesthetics like Baumgarten and Kant forfeited the foundational concepts of epistemology and political philosophy, claiming instead the subjective domains of beauty and taste. Among the most important consequences of this dissociation, according to White, is that it “deprive[d] art in general of any claim to a distinctively cognitive authority” (2010, 295). This ideology has not only impacted our notion of art but has also impacted our notion of truth: the aspirations of art stop where the work of truth begins, and vice versa. Thus truth is reinstatitated in its modernist epistemological guise, and art remains more or less confined to the superficial realm of subjective taste. The ideology of aestheticism, then, has provided aesthetic rhetoric
Heidegger and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric

with a distinctive project: like their forebears in the aesthetic tradition such as Baumgarten, Kant, and Nietzsche, contemporary theorists of aesthetic rhetoric have frequently articulated their mission in adamant opposition to epistemology and its traditional values, especially truth (see, e.g., Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson 2002, and Whitson and Poulakos 1993). Ultimately, this tension has prevented aesthetic rhetoric from addressing a number of potentially productive questions about the function of art beyond sensual experience and in particular about the possible relationship between art and a revitalized sense of sociopolitical truth. For instance, why must rhetoricians concede truth to the epistemologists, to those who insist on truth as a rationalistic enterprise preoccupied with the precise relations of subjects and objects (see Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson 2002, 123)? Rather than oppose truth to aesthetics, why can’t we follow Heidegger, Gadamer, and others in recovering a renewed sense of truth for the cause of art, thereby enhancing the scope and potential of both? As Scott Stroud has pointed out, if we posit aesthetics as merely subjective ornamentation, we risk overlooking the role that art, and in particular the rhetorical art, plays in the reproduction and rupture of political community (2008; see also Hariman 1992). So while we applaud the increasing popularity of rhetoric’s “aesthetic turn” (Greene 1998)—and while we appreciate this diversity among approaches to the aesthetics of rhetoric—we hope to enrich this conversation by providing a historically grounded critique of aesthetics that opens up more radical political possibilities to rhetoric as art.¹

While a number of scholars, including Whitson and Poulakos, have hinted that rhetorical theory might provide a productive space for rethinking the traditional ideologies of—and the traditional antimony between—artistic production and truth (1993, 138; see also Farrell 1986, Hariman 1998, Magee 2009, and Poulakos 2004, 92–93), this is a project that remains largely unfulfilled. In this article we use Heidegger’s critique of aesthetics to forge a path beyond the misguided oppositional couple of aesthetics/epistemology, offering a new understanding of the lasting public potential of the rhetorical art. After providing a historical critique of the ideology of aestheticism and exploring its implications for contemporary rhetorical theory, we develop a nonrationalistic, world-grounding sense of rhetorical truth anchored in Heidegger’s criteria for the “founding truth” of art: its capacities to bestow, ground, and begin a political community. Illustrating this schema through a reading of Simón Bolívar’s classic Angostura Address, we elaborate on rhetoric’s capacities as an ontogenetic, aletheiaic art through which a community’s cultural and political truth
can be challenged, ruptured, transformed, and rearticulated. Considering aesthetics in Heidegger’s terms allows us to shift our discussion away from the pleasure and desire of subjects and toward rhetoric’s potential to provide grounding instantiations of truth through which a community comes to know and reinvent itself.

TRUTH AND “AESTHETIC DIFFERENTIATION”

“Aesthetics” in its current sense is a modern neologism, coined in the eighteenth century by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. In reviving the ancient notion of the aesthetic, Baumgarten gave it a currency to which the Greek term “aesthēsis” had never aspired. Whereas for the Greeks aesthēsis signified those things perceived through the arousal of the five senses, Baumgarten located the significance of aesthetic judgment in the individual pleasure and “taste” of the perceiving subject (1954, 77–78). Connecting Baumgarten’s aesthetics to the anthropocentric philosophy of the Enlightenment, Poulakos writes that aesthetics “saw its fortunes rise as the individual subject started becoming one of the determining criteria of what is beautiful vis-à-vis the capacities and limitations of the human senses, especially taste, the most subjective of them all (2007, 337). Hence, from its modern inception the aesthetic domain was centered in the individual taste of the experiencing subject, whose “sense” of pleasure was paramount. Baumgarten thus bestowed on his successors a dichotomy of aesthēsis and noesis, an unfortunate and persistent binary that Howard Caygill (2003, 101) has recognized as essentially neo-Platonist (also see Heidegger 1977b, 54). Consequently, aesthetics was displaced to the subjective realm of “taste,” where its ambitions were tempered by the prestige of its rationalistic counter, noesis.

In what is arguably the capstone of this subjectivization, Kant’s Critique of Judgment posits that aesthetic judgments of taste owe nothing to truth because they are predicated on the subject, specifically on the subject’s feelings of pleasure in beholding the beautiful (see Hove 2009, 105). Indeed, for Kant an aesthetic judgment is “a judgment whose determining basis cannot be other than subjective” (1987, 44). At the same time, Kant’s position is also distinguished by its claim to subjective universality: “For if someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone. . . . [His] liking is not based on any inclination he has (nor on any other considered interest whatever): rather, the judging person feels completely free as regards the liking he accords the
object” (53–54). This freedom presupposes that all aesthetic judgments are universally valid, so long as they are subjectively disinterested. Judgments of taste presuppose, in other words, that beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

Although Schelling, Hegel, and others call into question Kant’s subjective universality, nineteenth-century aesthetic thinking thrived on what Gadamer calls “aesthetic differentiation”: the autonomy of aesthetics vis-à-vis the conceptual apparatuses employed in other traditions of thought, particularly epistemology (2004, 74–77). Truth, in particular, is sidelined. This sentiment finds its most popular and radical expression in Nietzsche, who happens to have been highly influential on the development of aesthetic rhetoric (see Whitson and Poulakos 1993, Thomas 1999, 162–66, and Crick 2011). Nietzsche’s well-known critique of truth—which denies the possibility of objective knowledge—is rooted in aesthetic perspectivism. According to this view, judgments of truth (or of any value, for that matter) are merely a function of individual perspectives and subjective designations, generated aesthetically via the creation and integration of different vantage points or conceptual schemes. As Nathan Crick argues, Nietzsche’s work can best be characterized by its attempt to provide “an aesthetic curative to modern philosophical malaise” (2011, 100), a counterbalance to philosophy’s sterile figure of the true. Indeed, throughout his work Nietzsche savages modern philosophy’s preoccupations with the true, even going so far as to mimic Kant’s vocabulary by declaring the “thing-in-itself” to be unintelligible (1999, 144). As this statement reveals, Nietzsche’s curative tendency reveals an aesthetic ontology that simultaneously reverses yet maintains the Baumgartenian–Kantian opposition between truth and art. He nowhere makes this clearer than in the notorious aphorism, “We possess art lest we perish of the truth” (1968, 435). Consequently Nietzsche’s aesthetic revisionism upends that conventional binary, expressing a “sweeping” monist sensibility that attacks truth because of its traditional privilege vis-à-vis myth and falsehood (Nehamas 1985, 44; see 42–73). So while Nietzsche’s conception of art—and its spectral relationship to the true—is a far cry from the subjectivism of Baumgarten and Kant, it reinstantiates the dichotomy between the values of art and truth and continues to prevent the question of truth from emerging in the artistic sphere. With Nietzsche, art enjoys pride of place among the tools of ideation, but ultimately, Nietzschean aesthetics merely provides an altered version of aesthetic differentiation. Despite its revolutionary importance in the history of aesthetic thought, it does not follow through on providing a reconciliation of truth and art and insists on their polar, if monistic, distance.
This long tradition has been absorbed into contemporary rhetorical theory, as aesthetic rhetoric has frequently been framed in opposition to endeavors concerned with truth. Steve Whitson and John Poulakos, who have made perhaps the clearest and most influential efforts to tie contemporary theory to the historical tradition of aesthetics, build aesthetic rhetoric on the notion that there are “radical differences between art and knowledge” (1993, 132; see also Poulakos 2007). Leveling truth and knowledge, a move common in epistemic rhetorical theory (see Scott 1967, 138), Whitson and Poulakos follow Nietzsche in rejecting any “adequate relation between subject and object,” thus dismissing the attribution of a truth value to rhetoric based on traditional epistemic criteria (1993, 133). In so doing, they reverse what Poulakos later calls the “epistemic hierarchy” (2007, 339) in favor of aesthetics, reducing truth in surprisingly Platonic fashion to a product of dialectics and then dismissing it as “appearance” or “illusion,” a move that has been echoed by Douglas Thomas (1994, 75). Barry Brummett has likewise defined aesthetic rhetoric against the truth of the epistemologists, arguing that “aesthetics is not a good ground for consensus, coherence, or truth in a modernist sense, if by that one means truth based on language and expositional argument. Truth is a concept that largely makes sense on a terrain of representational language, . . . but aesthetics nevertheless can ground a sense of fitness, decorum, and the appropriate in the place of representative truth” (2008, 22–23). Modifying “truth” with the qualifier “representative,” Brummett hints that aesthetic rhetoric might hold the key to some other kind of truth that transcends representation/epistemology. But Brummett leaves it to others to fully explore how aesthetics might be revised to present a more radical vision of rhetorical truth that helps us get over the mutually constricting dichotomization of truth and art.

Seeing this as one of our primary tasks, we would like to assert our solidarity with and indebtedness to the aesthetic rhetoric project. So while we agree with Whitson and Poulakos that “the paradigmatic tendency of language is rhetorical, not representational or referential” (1993, 139) and that an “epistemic rhetoric, a rhetoric that knows, is a dream first reported by Plato” (140), we contend that this dream lurks behind and exerts a surreptitious guiding influence on the ideology of aestheticism. Ultimately, we agree with Calvin O. Schrag that aestheticism “supplies an intelligible response [to truth] only so long as truth is viewed as single, unitary, logocentric, and hegemonic” (1992, 74). Pre-Heideggerian aesthetics, we argue, is limited in what it can offer rhetoric because of its oppositional relationship to epistemology. On the one hand, traditional aesthetics operates within, rather
Heidegger and the aesthetics of rhetoric

than apart from, philosophy’s traditional delineation of what is productive of truth, and, on the other hand, traditional aesthetics prevents us from describing a rhetoric that would be at once artistic and truthful—a rhetoric that would owe its truth not to noesis or the syllogism but to the creative unconcealment of new ways for a people to be together as they encounter the unfolding truth of their community.

Heidegger’s Critique of Aesthetics

One key to uncovering this truthful art of rhetoric lies in Heidegger’s interrelated critiques of epistemology and aestheticism. In the 1930s Heidegger turned his attention away from the hermeneutics of Dasein, which had preoccupied him throughout much of his early career, and began to focus more on questions of art, language, and poetry. This “turning” (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thinking frequently led him to the problem of truth, which he addressed through a destructive foray into the history of Western thought. Heidegger revives an ancient Greek concept, aletheia, which he presents as a fuller and more productive sense of truth. “Aletheia,” which Heidegger renders as “unconcealedness” (cf. Poulakos and Crick, 2012, 301–3), had been a centerpiece of Greek thought since at least the time that Hesiod penned his myth of the river Lethe. But according to Heidegger, this sense of truth was lost when aletheia suffered a severe blow at the hands of Roman translators, who rendered the term as “verum” (1998, 46–50; 1971, 23). In the words of one of Heidegger’s earliest American disciples, this misappropriation caused the Romans and their modern inheritors to “understand truth to reside in the conformity of judgment to judged, and the degree of truth as the exactness of this conformity” (Anderson, 1968, 41). But Heidegger, in order to revive the historical truth of aletheia—as “unconcealment,” as the bringing forth into presencing (1977a, 12–13)—turned to an unlikely object: the work of art. “What is truth,” he asks, “that it can happen as, or even must happen as, art?” (1971, 57).

In a key departure from the German aesthetic tradition, Heidegger sought to simultaneously rehabilitate truth and art by exploring each through the lens of the other. In order to displace the aestheticist prejudices that clouded modern philosophies of art, Heidegger needed to reveal what was truthful in the artwork and in order to recover a truth unwed to epistemology and the myopia of verum, Heidegger needed to demonstrate the aletheiaic truth of an enterprise like art. In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger observes that “for us moderns . . .
the beautiful is what reposes and relaxes; it is intended for enjoyment and art is a matter for pastry cooks. . . . For [a]esthetics art is representation of the beautiful in the sense of the pleasing, the pleasant. . . . On the strength of a recaptured, pristine relation to being we must provide the word ‘art’ with a new content” (1961, 111). For Heidegger, the aestheticism of Baumgarten, Kant, and Nietzsche was a defining symptom of modern metaphysical thinking: by treating the work of art as merely an aesthetic object for an experiencing subject—by describing art in such a way that it could be applied to a bran muffin—“the art work becomes the object of mere subjective experience [Erlebnis], and . . . consequently art is considered to be an expression of human life” (1977a, 116). If viewed from the subjectivist lens of the aesthetic tradition, art’s value is radically attenuated, consigning it to a realm in which pleasure and subjective judgment reign. But Heidegger, along with his followers like Gadamer and Schrag, sets out to dismantle the ideology of aestheticism by posing new questions about the relationship between art and truth: as Schrag asks in the Resources of Rationality, “If not eliminated with the help of a Nietzschean-like aestheticism, can the grammar of truth in some way be salvaged and kept within the philosophical lexicon? Is truth but a vestige of logocentric nostalgia, or can it be rethought in some manner—possibly through a Heideggerian retrieval of a poetic world-disclosure?” (1992, 71).

In a move that defies Nietzsche’s aesthetic metaphysics and sidesteps epistemology’s logocentric baggage, Heidegger declares that art is “truth setting itself to work” (1971, 36). This cryptic claim forwards several crucial, interrelated amendments to the epistemology/aesthetics dichotomy. First, it implies that by “setting itself to work” truth is original and creative rather than merely derivative or representational; second, it argues that truth is dynamic—that, rather than being timeless or static, truth “happens” in a processual setting-forth; third, it suggests that truth is historically situated and is accessible rather than transcendent or noumenal (see Hyde 1994, 386–87, and Zuidervaart 2002, 154–55). Heidegger continues this train of thought by reinterpreting artistic truth through the light of aletheia. By resuscitating this ancient concept, “we are not,” he states, “merely taking refuge in a more literal translation of a Greek word. We are reminding ourselves of what, unexperienced and unthought, underlies our familiar and therefore outworn nature of truth in the sense of correctness” (1971, 52). It is the subtle and primordial unconcealment of beings in their being, Heidegger writes, that allows truth to come out into the world: in this
capacity, *aletheia* is a creative happening that calls beings into the truth of their existence. As Gadamer writes in a brilliant analysis of Heidegger’s *Origin of the Work of Art*: “In the work of art, in which a world arises, not only is something meaningful given to experience that was not known before, but also something new comes into existence with the work of art itself” (1994, 105). By revising the extraordinary conditions of (im)possibility that epistemology had placed on truth, Heidegger captures a creative, aletheiaic truthfulness to which the work of art—and, as we argue, the art of rhetoric—can lay claim.3

What is most revolutionary about Heidegger’s deconstruction of aesthetics/epistemology is that, in the words of Rudolf Gasché, it lifts “the common-sensical and ‘philosophical’ concept of truth . . . above its isolation” (1999, 32). Heidegger’s thought thereby defangs philosophy by democratizing its formerly exclusive cargo, establishing a plurality of truthful enterprises. The arts, and especially the long subsumed art of rhetoric, are thus freed, enabling them to more autonomously imagine their own relationship to the true (see Schufreider 2010, 335–36). In bestowing a radical autonomy on the arts, Heidegger frees them from their constrictive opposition vis-à-vis philosophy, placing them in equal possession of the true. Yet this truth is not something that the arts have inherited from philosophy; they have not merely learned from philosophy how to concoct their own little artistic epistemologies, or their epistemic arts. Rather, philosophy’s truth is recognized in its historical particularity, and arts like rhetoric are given the freedom to confront, articulate, and critique their own relationship to the true. A step is thus taken toward correcting what Robert Hariman (1986) refers to as rhetoric’s traditional “marginality” vis-à-vis philosophy, which he insightfully traces to rhetoric’s historical role as the custodian of doxa rather than *episteme*, two concepts that have been frequently dichotomized at the expense of rhetoric.

**SPEAKING THE FOUNDING TRUTH: ALETHEIAIC RHETORICAL ACTION**

The recent English translation of Heidegger’s 1924 summer semester lecture course on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* has renewed interest in Heidegger’s contributions to rhetorical theory. Rhetoric scholars have turned to these valuable lectures to parse out Heidegger’s thinking on rhetoric, a topic he rarely addressed in any direct way. One aspect of these lectures, in particular, has
the potential to generate controversy among rhetoric scholars. As Michael J. Hyde has pointed out, the young Heidegger of the 1924 summer lectures assigns rhetoric a seemingly representational capacity, portraying it as “the saying and ‘showing-forth’ (epi-deixis) . . . of what is” (2010, 164). This characterization, according to Hyde, stands in contrast to Heidegger’s later praise of poetry as the “original bringing-forth (poiesis) of the truth of what is to our attention” (2005, 196). Unfortunately, Heidegger never addresses this contrast between “showing-forth” and “bringing-forth”—between the apparently different aletheiaic capacities of rhetoric and poetry—and so this work leaves us with a laudatory yet ultimately constricting view of rhetoric’s ability to act on the world. Therefore, as Hyde warns, by assigning poetry a more original, creative project, Heidegger risks reducing rhetoric to a mere “handmaiden of poetry” (2006, 68).

Because we are likewise dissatisfied with the possibilities that Heidegger assigns to rhetoric during this moment of his early career (2006, 68–69), we propose to take Hyde’s critique of Heidegger one step further: while we agree that Heidegger appears to have misstepped in his relative parsing of rhetoric and poetry, we would like to offer a different perspective of this conflict by reading Heidegger against himself. Ultimately, we think that Heidegger’s later thoughts on language and poetry provide useful insights into the rhetorical art, even if Heidegger himself did not apply them specifically to rhetoric. While Heidegger perhaps underestimated the capacities of rhetoric during his 1924 summer semester lecture course, this was a time in his early career when he had relatively little to say about poetry or the power of language in general. It is not until the 1930s and ’40s that Heidegger begins to “turn” more toward language and art, making his later work of considerable interest to those who wish to extend Heidegger’s contribution to rhetorical theory. Thus despite the considerable value of Heidegger’s lecture course on the Rhetoric, we argue that scholars should remain open to theorizing Heidegger’s contributions to rhetoric that go beyond the contents of these early lectures, particularly as they allow us to reimagine the capacities of the artistic word to remake the world.

Based on Heidegger’s later assertions about the founding truths of art and the “ontological priority” that he detected in poetry (Hyde 2005, 69), we propose to reconsider rhetoric as an art of political poetry. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger defines language as “poetry in the essential sense” of a projective saying, by which he means the unconcealment of beings through language, or the moving forward via language
toward the disclosure of a particular being, of what and how it is (1977a, 199). In contrast to the compartmental, aesthetic conception of fine art—according to which poetry, sculpture, painting, and the like are remitted to a private, autonomous realm separate from virtually all forms of associated life—Heidegger defines poetry as the essence of art, as that which names beings for the first time, thereby bringing them “to word and to appearance” (1971, 71). Poetry in this broad sense does not involve abstracting language from the context of life or isolating a peculiar aesthetic quality, nor does it reduce people to their individual experiences; rather, it announces their appearance and projects their historical possibility. But while announcing constitutes the aletheiaic function of poetry, the poetic function of language brings forth, in the form of understanding, the possibility of a shared sense of community. In other words, Heidegger sees poetry as not only revealing truth by disclosing particular beings but also as creating the truth it reveals (Megill 1985, 158–59). Heidegger, however, is careful to distinguish art’s creation from mere making, stating that “to create is to cause something to emerge as a thing that has been brought forth” (1971, 58). This ontogenetic aspect of poetry, and of art and language, clarifies Heidegger’s neologism “projective saying”: “Projective saying is saying which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world. In such saying, the concepts of an historical people’s nature, i.e., of its belonging to world history, are formed for that folk, before it” (71). Poetry brings a historical community into affiliation with the truth happening in the work. Because such truth is the disclosure of a unique being—a being-for and being-with one another—its projection inaugurates that being’s historical existence as the creative possibility opened up by unconcealment. According to Hubert L. Dreyfus, in each such case the being that is brought to appearance reconfigures the style of the culture in which it emerges. For that reason, he argues, “each time a culture gets a new artwork, the understanding of being changes and human beings and things show up differently” (2007, 415). Nevertheless, in light of art’s capacity to bring forth, the projection of being goes beyond merely reshaping a community’s cultural sensibility to (re)establish the community as such. The reconfiguration of a particular collective being is at the same time the founding of its emergent truth.

Challenging theories that would render rhetoric either a rational enterprise or an aesthetic expression, Heidegger’s insights into the truth of art point to an understanding of rhetoric as something that lies outside what is generally meant by “the art of civic discourse.” Considering
rhetoric in terms of aletheiaic poetry opens up the suggestive possibility of reconceiving rhetoric as a projection that founds a sense of community by means of the dual process of disclosure and creation. Rhetoric can establish a community’s truth as the driving forward toward, or the projection of, its own possibility of being. A projective rhetoric would therefore consist in opening up the truth of particular beings (their unique being-together) and in bringing forth their unconcealment; it would designate both the revealing-disclosing of the truth of beings and the creating-establishing of the truth that had been unconcealed. More than a capacity, the art of rhetoric reveals itself to be aletheiaic: a projective saying that founds the truth of a historical community and, by that means, reconfigures its own self-understanding. Hence it founds the sense of community by unconcealing the truth of beings and projecting as possibility the sense that will be seen as having founded the community. In a word, rhetoric’s founding of truth is an announcement of what it is that beings come into their appearance as. It is an art that effectuates what Heidegger calls “the naming power of the word” (1971, 43), and in naming a people it transports them to the space of their truth.1 Rhetoric thus remains a civic art but not of persuasion, much less of discursive ornamentation. As the founding of a community’s truth, it is more than technē: it is political poetry (see Heidegger 2009, 91–92).

Heidegger identifies three stages in the setting-forth of this founding truth: founding as bestowing, founding as grounding, and founding as beginning. First, as a way of bestowing, founding signals a double movement, or dual function, that “thrusts up the unfamiliar and extraordinary and at the same time thrusts down the ordinary and what we believe to be such” (1971, 72). In establishing the community’s space of appearance, bestowing sets up its truth “in the sense of a consecrating-praising erection” (44). This bestowing, Heidegger tells us, is a venerating overflow of what is opened up by the emergence of the truth of beings. At the same time, it reveals its historical inheritance while nevertheless disarticulating itself from and subduing that which came before. Second, this founding is a grounding in the sense that it extends the emergent truth beyond the present and prepares it for “the coming preservers,” that is, “a historical group of human beings.” It is a casting forth of what is unconcealed, an opening up of what is projected. Grounding, too, sets up the truth but in contrast to bestowing orients it toward a new future by calling people to be preservers, and in calling them, it constitutes them as such. Finally, as
beginning, the founding of a truth constitutes an unmediated leap into history: “Whenever art happens—that is, whenever there is a beginning—a thrust enters history; history either begins or starts over again” (74). Every beginning of art is thus an irruption within being of a new and emergent world. This world, along with the poetry that founds it, is historical, endowing the ground with everything it will call future people to preserve; it is the origin both of art and of a community’s historical existence. These three modes of founding point up the true nature and importance of an aletheiaic art of rhetoric, of rhetorical action in the projective sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning. And they suggest certain works in which this triple sense of founding is not only articulated but also enacted: establishing a people’s truth in such a way as to constitute “[an] act that founds a political state” (60). As Theodor Kisiel (2005) has demonstrated, such a Heideggerian understanding of rhetoric posits that through “communication and struggle”—through aletheiaic rhetorical action—“a people finds its way to an authentic grouping by actualizing the historical uniqueness and self-identity of its community” (142; see Heidegger 1996, 385, and Heidegger 1998, 17). Rhetoric is an art that brings us into the truth of our being-together.

To clarify rhetoric’s aletheiaic capacity to bestow, ground, and begin, we submit that Simón Bolívar’s Angostura Address of 1819 (delivered at the inauguration of the Congress of Angostura) exemplifies the projective saying of a political community:3 Without discounting the importance of this vision for the struggle of South American independence, and without idolizing the figure of Simón Bolívar as the savior/midwife of a people, we maintain that the Angostura Address—as an act of declaration, or, as we are arguing, of founding—unconceals a new political world and hence new ways for this people to be with one another. Given during the wars of independence fought by Columbia and Venezuela, the speech inaugurated the new Venezuelan congress while simultaneously articulating an ideal political system inspired by the historical grounding of classical Athens and modern European republics. Following the conventions of Enlightenment political writing, Bolívar’s speech is a conspectus of ancient and modern polities that begins in the ancient world with historical political surveys of Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Rome and concludes with the modern political models of England, France, and Britain. The latter were particularly important to Bolívar’s vision of a new political system. According to Simon Collier, “In essence, Bolívar transferred the British model . . . to republican
Venezuela, recommending an elected lower house and a hereditary upper house (a senate) combined with a strong executive, a president instead of a king (2008, 19). This broad political bestowal from the classical and modern worlds is perhaps clearest in Bolívar’s call for a fourth, “moral” branch of government based on the Athenian’s Council of Areopagus.6

Bolívar calls for a new constitution, just as he inaugurates a legislative body, but in so doing he announces the conditions for the founding of a people’s historico-political truth: “All our moral powers will be insufficient to save our incipient republic from . . . chaos unless we can unify our people, our government and our legislation in national unity. Our motto must be unity, unity, unity. . . . Our laws are the sad remains of all ancient and modern despotisms: so let the monstrous structure be demolished, let it fall, and withdrawing from its ruins, let us erect a temple to justice, and under the auspices of its sacred influence, let us discuss a code of Venezuelan laws” (2009, 99–100). Then, referring to Venezuela’s first congress and the 1811 Federal Constitution of Venezuela, Bolívar bestows consecrating-praise, exclaiming that “my mind is filled with joy at the great progress made by our republic in its glorious career—loving what is useful, animated by what is just, and aspiring to what is perfect” (84). He goes on to remark that “Venezuela, on separating from Spain, recovered her independence and liberty, her equality and her national sovereignty. Constituting herself into a democratic republic, she . . . declared the rights of man, and freedom of action, freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom to write. Those liberal acts, and the purity which engendered them, cannot be praised highly enough” (84). Attesting to the grandeur of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Venezuela, he describes the document as “the most glorious, the most heroic, and the most dignified act of a free people” (103). He extols Venezuela’s military history, proclaiming that its “brilliant sacrifices” rank among the republic heroism of the ancients and its virtues among “the most sublime and honourable feelings that have ever been attributed to the benefactors of the human race” (103). Of a piece with this praise is a critical dismissal and thrusting down of the past—specifically, the provincialism that divided what would become a united Venezuela—and a thrusting up of a new world, “the centralization and union of all the states of Venezuela into a single and indivisible republic,” whose code of laws would “erect a temple of justice” (102, 106).

At the same time, this adoration is also both a “ground laying,” acclaiming the communal self-identity that Bolívar aspires to actualize, and
heidegger and the aesthetics of rhetoric

a beginning, since the new congress is to reinstitute Venezuela's historical uniqueness by rebeginning. Speaking toward Venezuela's future preservers, Bolívar reminds the congress of its ground-laying importance, exclaiming, "Legislators! Consider well the matter in hand. Keep in mind that you are about to form a fundamental code for an incipient people" (82), which, if preserved, will fully realize "an inclination to liberty" (83). And in seeking to advance this inclination for an emergent people, Bolívar avows that "I dare add that the Venezuelan senate will not only be a bulwark for liberty, but will be the core that perpetuates the Republic" (83, 94). Yet the inauguration itself is a beginning of the truth that Bolívar is conferring on and preparing for a unified Venezuela; it is the thrusting of the Venezuelan people into history, a transportation into their historical endowment as free citizens of an independent republic. This is what he asserts when he proclaims "Legislators! I place Venezuela's supreme command in your hands. It is your solemn duty to dedicate yourselves to the happiness of the Republic. In your hands lies the balance of our destiny and the measure of our glory. Your decisions will confirm the decrees which establish our liberty" (79). Much more than a respectful outline of a constitution, Bolívar's Angostura Address is an enactment of that constitution, an inauguration of a new society, and a redeclaration of the republic. For that reason, it is nothing short of an institution of a unique political existence, which preceding its unconcealment had been "virtually nil" (81). Currently, Bolívar's truth is being collectively regrounded by the living citizens of Venezuela and other South American countries, particularly through the efforts of what Hugo Chávez has called Venezuela's ongoing "Bolivarian revolution." As Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala point out, "While for Bólivar the union of Latin America was against Spanish oppressors, for Chávez the unification is against the U.S. neoliberal and military impositions that, together with the 'dictatorship of the Monetary Fund,' have reduced the region to a great slum, that is, the discharge of capitalism" (2011, 124–25). This ongoing preservation of Bolívar's truth—which is also its historical rejuvenation—illuminates the vulnerable, grounding sociopolitical value of the rhetorical art beyond its aesthetic charms.

CONCLUSION

Instead of inquiring into whether and how rhetoric might serve as a mode of knowing or a means of generating sensation, we have argued for
treating rhetorical action as an element in the founding and rearticulation of a community in its social and moral being. As we have argued, rhetoric has the potential to establish the truth of a historical community’s being-together. As such it brings this community forth by illuminating, but also by reconfiguring, its shared cultural sensibility—its sensus communis—and projecting this “sense” to the present community as well as to the coming preservers of its truth. What Gadamer writes of the artist and artistic creation applies equally to the aletheiaic rhetor and rhetorical action: “The artist no longer speaks for the community, but forms his own community insofar as he expresses himself. . . . In fact, all artistic creation challenges each of us to listen to the language in which the work of art speaks and to make it our own’ (1986, 39). This aletheiaic rhetoric, in other words, calls for speakers and listeners whose responsibilities consist in the acts of re-creating and preserving a community’s truth. As such, this aletheiaic labor need not be carried out by as momentous an address as Bolivar’s; oftentimes less dramatic rhetorical acts put the truth to work, with their effects being dispersed, accumulative, and remote, compelling future preservers to reinvent the values first thrust up by that founding rhetorical action.

Through this act of founding, rhetoric functions constitutively to make possible the preservation of a truth, creating its preservers’ conditions of possibility and shaping—without completely determining—their “historical categories,” such as the social, political, and economic (Mailloux 1991, 234). At the same time, rhetoric’s constitutive capacity goes beyond structuring the identity of those to whom a truth is addressed (Charland 1987). While it may include processes of identification, preservation requires an active commitment to the founding of a truth, and this entails renewing a community’s commitment to its own historical emergence. This truth, as Heidegger reminds us, is a happening. It is also a doing. Rhetoric, we argue, can serve as a model for this doing that is at once a happening. As in the case of the Angostura Address, often a rhetorical performance will set the truth to work, summoning the preservers who will rearticulate and refresh its founding truth. By taking part in this founding, rhetoric plays a pivotal role in the ontogenesis and revolution of communities. And as theorists, historians, and critics of rhetoric, we provide points of articulation in the unconcealment of this truth. In that capacity, we have a share in preserving, challenging, and refounding the historical truth of our communities. It is this collective intellectual task of setting in motion the unthought possible that Heidegger championed nearly fifty years ago: “The greatness of what is to be thought
Heidegger and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric

is too great for us today. Perhaps we can struggle with building narrow and not very far-reaching footbridges for a crossing” (1990, 65).

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NOTES

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1. In a further example of the diversity of theoretical approaches to aesthetic rhetoric, Ronald Greene (1998) has traced rhetorical theory’s “aesthetic turn” to a general theoretical recognition of the constitutive and performative nature of rhetorical action.


3. For a different take on the relationship between speech and aletheia in Heidegger’s thought, see Marassi 1987, 83–84.

4. As our analysis suggests, we follow John Caputo (1993) in presenting a “demythologized” Heidegger that assigns more radical possibilities to rhetorical action. We emphasize with Theodore Kisiel that even in Heidegger’s early work there is a preoccupation with redemption and the possible. For Kisiel, Heidegger’s ostensibly conservative bent “is not as arch conservative as it sounds, when we couple it with a sense of being that is always that which ‘also can be otherwise,’ especially in the generational exchange at the core of historicity” (2000, 204; also see Heidegger 1996, 385–86, and Poulakos 1984). We fully acknowledge, however, that there is considerable validity to other more conservative readings of Heidegger’s political/rhetorical thought, such as those put forward by Pierre Bourdieu (1991) and Michael J. Hyde (1994). In the face of this ambivalence, we are compelled to give Heidegger a degree of hermeneutic charity, while recognizing, with Hyde (389–90), that this charity is generous and perhaps in some respects undeserved.

5. Bolivar delivered the address on February 19, 1819, in Angostura (today Ciudad Bolivar). The congress lasted until July 31, 1821, when the congress of Cúcuta began its sessions (Bushnell and Langley 2008, xiii–xiv).
6. Bolívar's speech preceded an intensive series of military victories, from the mid-1819 victory at Boyacá to the defeat of royalist forces at Ayacucho at the end of 1824. As Richard W. Slatta and Jane Lucas de Grummond argue, this period sees Bolívar at "the height of his military and political glory" (2003, 199; cf. 169–258). According to Venezuela's recently deceased president, President Hugo Chávez, Bolívar's desire for independence expressed a unitary vision for a project that was "continental, anti-imperialist, republican, egalitarian and libertarian," a vision of "a united equa-libertarian Latin America" (2009, xii, xv).

WORKS CITED


heidegger and the aesthetics of rhetoric


heidegger and the aesthetics of rhetoric


